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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN OKLAHOMA BUSINESS
ENTITY LAW
GARY W. DERRICK* & IRVING

L. FAUGHT**

L Introduction

Oklahoma corporate and other business entity statutes have changed
markedly in the past few years. In 1986, the Oklahoma General Corporation
Act (OGCA),' a Delaware-based act, replaced the Oklahoma Business
Corporation Act.2 In 1992, the Oklahoma legislature passed the Oklahoma
Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act)3 that introduced a new type of
business entity to Oklahoma. Limited liability companies (LLCs) account for
more than half of the new business entity filings with the Secretary of State.4
© 2003 Gary W. Derrick & Irving L. Faught
* Gary W. Derrick is a partner in the Oklahoma City law firm of Derrick & Briggs, LLP.
He received a Bachelors of Art degree in 1976 from Oklahoma State University and a Juris
Doctorate in 1979 from the University of Oklahoma. Since 1986, he has chaired the Oklahoma
General Corporation Act Committee. See supra note 19.
** Irving L. Faught is the Administrator of the Oklahoma Department of Securities. He
is a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law and the University of Oklahoma.
Before his appointment as Administrator, Mr. Faught engaged in the private practice of
corporate and securities law in Oklahoma City.
1. 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1001-1144 (2001).
2. See generally IRVING L. FAUGHT, OKLAHOMA BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: FORMATION
AND REPRESENTATION, § 1.2, at 1-4 to 1-5 (1 th ed. 2002), for a discussion of the history of
Oklahoma corporation laws.
3. 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2000-2060 (2001).
4. For the fiscal year ending in 2002, 7016 domestic LLCs were filed in Oklahoma
compared to 6454 domestic profit corporations, 242 domestic limited partnerships, and 12
domestic limited liability partnerships (LLPs). Oklahoma Secretary of State, Filing Statistics
for Fiscal Years Ended 1997 Through 2002 (on file with Gary W. Derrick) [hereinafter
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In 1996, the legislature passed the Oklahoma Limited Liability Partnership
Act.' The following year, the legislature replaced this act with the more
comprehensive Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).6 RUPA also
replaced the Uniform Partnership Act that the legislature enacted in 1916.7 In
1984, the legislature adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(RULPA).8 In 2000, the legislature revised Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) to expand the Article's scope, clarify the issues
about the creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests, and
provide for electronic filings. 9 In 2001, the legislature adopted Senate Bill
610, an eighty-six-page bill implementing numerous changes in the OGCA
and the LLC Act.' °
The breadth of change in Oklahoma is not unique. Other states have busily
adopted similar legislation as states compete against one another to retain
existing business and attract new business." All fifty states now have LLC
acts and forty-eight states have LLP provisions, both of which were virtually
unknown a generation ago.' 2 Forty-six states adopted the UCC Article 9
revisions less than two years after approval by the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 13

Oklahoma Secretary of State Filing Statistics].
5. 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 401-417 (Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
6. 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-100 to -1207 (2001).
7. 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201-243 (1991) (repealed 1997).
8. Oklahoma Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 50,
at 181 (codified as amended at 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301-365 (2001)).
9. 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-9-101 to 1-9-710 (2001); see Fred H. Miller, Prefatory Note to
the Oklahoma Comments, reprintedin 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. art. 9 (West 2001).
10. S.610, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2001) (enacted).
11. Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Formsfor Closely Held Firms, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369
(1995). "[T]he rapid evolution of the LLC demonstrates that jurisdictions compete for
formations of closely held firms. Not only have the states rushed to enact these statutes and
firms rushed to organize as LLCs, but over a very short period there has been a remarkable
evolution of statutory terms." Id. at 430-31.
12. See tables of state adoptions: for LLCs, LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT KEATINGE,
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES app. D (West 1992 & Supp. 2002-2);
for LLPs, ALAN BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED
LIABiITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIPACT AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101 (e) (2002).

13. See Revised UCC Article 9, Secured Transactions (1999), at http:f/nccusl/org/nccusl/
uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca9.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
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While these dramatic statutory changes seem to have encouraged business
development in Oklahoma,14 the role of the courts in adjudicating corporate
disputes and interpreting these statutes has been less pronounced. Oklahoma
appellate courts decide only a few business and corporate law cases each
year.' 5 The decisions that appear often are marked by a lack of clarity,
perhaps reflecting the courts' difficulty in keeping pace with the specialized
legal knowledge required to adjudicate these types of cases.
To understand Oklahoma corporate law, it is important to see both the
Oklahoma statutes and case law in a broad context. Oklahoma courts decide
just a few corporate cases each year, but many cases are adjudicated nationally - especially in Delaware regarding corporate law matters and in the
federal courts regarding securities law matters. Traditionally, the Delaware
courts' decisions influence corporate law practice nationally and should
influence interpretation of Oklahoma corporate law. "The general rule in
Oklahoma is that where one state has adopted statutes from another state, [as
Oklahoma has done from Delaware,] at the time of such adoption decisions
from the latter state are persuasive in the adopting state's construction of such

14. The formation of LLC's in Oklahoma increased from 3039 in 1997 to 7016 in 2002,
representing a 131% increase over the period. The numbers are notable considering that LLC's
did not exist in Oklahoma before 1992. Oklahoma Secretary of State Filing Statistics, supra
note 4.
15. Considering cases dealing primarily with corporate or corporate-related law issues, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Courts of Civil Appeal combined issued published opinions
in only one case in 1999 (InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. Fleming Companies, 1999
OK 3,975 P.2d 907); two cases in 2000 (Sutterv. Sutter Ranching Corp., 2000 OK 84, 14 P.3d
58 and Total Access, Inc. v. Caddo Electric Cooperative, 2000 OK CIV APP 60, 9 P.3d 95);
three cases in 2001 (Corman v. H-30 Drilliing, Inc., 2001 OK 92, 40 P.3d 1051 (dealing
primarily with charter reinstatement and ability of corporation to defend), Weeks v. Manchester,
2001 OK CI APP 101, 29 P.3d 616, and K.J. McNitt Construction, Inc. v. Economopoulos,
2001 OK CIV APP 45, 23 P.3d 983 (dealing primarily with director and officer liability during
charter suspension)); and two cases in 2002 (CardiovascularSurgical Specialists, Corp. v.
Mammana, 2002 OK 27, 61 P.3d 210, and Winston v. Stewart & Elder,P.C., 2002 OK 68, 55
P.3d 1063). Of these cases, Corman and McNitt deal primarily with the non-payment of
franchise taxes, Mammana deals with non-competes and arbitration, and Winston deals with a
debtor's obligations to creditors who are former shareholders; only Fleming, Sutter and Weeks
directly involve the OGCA or the rights and duties of directors and shareholders.
In comparison, in fiscal 2002, the Delaware Supreme Court disposed of fifty-eight cases
from the Court of Chancery, which is the specialized court dealing with corporate law matters.
The Court of Chancery disposed of over 900 civil (corporate or fiduciary) cases in the same
period. See 2002 Statistical Report of the Delaware Judiciary, availableat http://courts.state.de.
us/ (last visited July 4, 2003).
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laws." ' 6 Thus, the decisions of the Delaware courts are vital to a correct
understanding of Oklahoma corporate law.
Other external influences on Oklahoma corporate law may derive from
developments following the publicized financial collapses of companies such
as Enron, Worldcom, and Global Crossing. 7 These spectacular failures have
focused unprecedented public attention on corporate governance. While state
law generally controls corporate governance, federal securities laws and
regulations and the listing standards of the stock exchanges have generated
greater change in this area. Nevertheless, several state legislatures are
attempting to strengthen corporate governance laws, and it is possible that
these efforts might develop into a trend. 8
To aid in understanding Oklahoma's laws for corporations and other
entities, this article will outline the Oklahoma legislative and judicial
developments between October 2001 and October 2002. It will also forecast
possible future developments that might stem from external influences and
from internal trends.
II. Legislative Developments
A. Senate Bill 610
The Oklahoma General Corporation Act Committee of the Oklahoma Bar
Association (OGCA Committee) prepared a number of amendments to the
OGCA, the LLC Act, and RULPA that emerged in Senate Bill 610.19 Senate
16. FAUGHT, supranote 2, § 1.1, at 1-2; Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 1991 OK 50,
11, 812 P.2d 1355, 1358. The court also stated that "subsequent interpretations placed upon
such laws are not controlling or conclusive." Id.; see, e.g., Bank of the Lakes v. First State
Bank, 1985 OK 81, 9, 708 P.2d 1089, 1091; Anderson v. Fry, 1955 OK 286, 1 3, 288 P.2d
1111, 1112. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has stated that since the OGCA is based on
Delaware law, it should be interpreted in accordance with Delaware decisions. Woolf v.
Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 1992 OK CIV APP 129, 1 6, 849 P.2d 1093, 1095. However, the
holding in InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. Fleming Companies, 1999 OK 3, 25,
975 P.2d 907, 913 (holding that shareholders do have the power to adopt binding bylaws that
restrict the board's ability to implement shareholder rights plans), may bring into question the
will of the Oklahoma courts to analyze Delaware case law and apply Delaware statutory
construction principles where there is no case "on all fours."
17. For a general account, see CHRISTOPHER L. CULP &WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, CORPORATE
AFrERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR

CORPORATIONS (2003).

18. See infra notes 174-80.
19. Act Relating to Business Entities, 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 405, 3069. The OGCA
Committee is a committee of the Business Associations Section of OBA. It was formed in 1984
to pursue modernization of the Oklahoma Business Corporation Act, which the legislature
adopted in 1947. It prepared the OGCA to replace the Business Corporation Act, and the

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/14

2003]

DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS ENTITY LAW

Bill 610 constituted one of the broader bills proposed by the OGCA
Committee in recent years. The bill amended the OGCA to incorporate recent
Delaware amendments. The bill also made changes in the LLC Act, RULPA,
the Oklahoma Cooperative Marketing Association Act, and provisions dealing
with taxes on property deeds.
1. The Technology Amendments
Senate Bill 610 incorporated many recent changes to the Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL). The legislature changed several sections of the
OGCA to authorize corporations to use the Internet and "electronic
transmissions" in various ways. Such amendments made it possible to hold
shareholder meetings and vote by the Internet, to adopt written consents by email, to provide e-mail notice for director and shareholder meetings, and to
store and retrieve corporate records, including shareholder lists, electronically.
Each of these changes is discussed below.
To implement the "technology amendments," the legislature amended
subsections B and F of section 1027 of the OGCA to permit directors to
submit resignations and written consents by e-mail.2" A change in subsection
F.4 broadened the type of communication equipment that directors can use to
participate in a meeting when not physically present. 2'
The legislature adopted much more extensive changes in sections relating
to shareholders. It amended section 1056, which relates to shareholder
meetings, to permit shareholders (1) to attend and participate in meetings
using remote communication; (2) to hold meetings with no physical location;
and (3) to vote by e-mail or the Internet.2 2 Section 1064, which deals with
shareholder voting lists, now enables a corporation to maintain the list
electronically if (1) the list is reasonably accessible and (2) the means of
legislature adopted the OGCA in 1986. 1986 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 405, 1311. The OGCA
closely follows the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), and was intended to bootstrap
the large body of Delaware corporate law into Oklahoma jurisprudence. James C. Gibbens &
Kimberly Edwards, The ProposedNew Oklahoma Business CorporationAct, 57 OKLA. B.J.
508, 508 (1986). Since its inception, the OGCA Committee has proposed legislation affecting
business entities almost annually. It has followed the practice of amending the OGCA to
parallel the DGCL. By periodically implementing Delaware's changes, Oklahoma retains the
large body of Delaware jurisprudence for guidance and predictability in business affairs. The
OGCA Committee's work also covers LLCs, LLPs, limited partnerships, professional entities,
and partnerships under RUPA. The OGCA Committee's efforts help ensure that Oklahoma's
statutory provisions with respect to these areas of the law remain current in an ever-changing
business environment.
20. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1027(B), (F)(1) (2001).
21. Id. § 1027(F)(4).
22. Id. § 1056(A)(1)-(2).
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access are described in the notice of meeting.23 A new section 1075.2 further
permits corporations to give a shareholder notice by facsimile transmission,
e-mail, or the Internet with the shareholder's consent. 24 Finally, as with
directors, shareholders may now act by written consents given by e-mail.25
These amendments are voluntary. They do not require corporations to
conduct their affairs by e-mail or implement any technology changes at all.26
Many of the changes, especially those dealing with shareholder meetings,
must be authorized by the board of directors and require specialized
procedures for implementation.27 Thus, despite the statutory amendments,
many corporations must amend their bylaws before using the new forms of
communication.2 8
The technology amendments offer potential cost savings to all corporations.
Sending notices by e-mail is cheaper and faster than sending paper notices.
Small corporations may realize the greatest savings. A corporation with only
five shareholders could implement a "cyberspace" meeting that would be
impossible for a large, publicly held corporation. Large, publicly held
corporations have used, however, electronic voting extensively and many have
supplemented their physical shareholders meetings with webcasts. 29 The
possibility of electronic communications and "placeless" electronic meetings
will not eliminate the need for physical meetings. Written consents in lieu of
meetings have been available to directors and shareholders for decades, yet
23. Id. § 1064(A)(1).
24. Id. § 1075.2.
25. Id. § 1073(D).
26. See, e.g., id. § 1064(A) ("Nothing contained in this section shall require the corporation
to include electronic mail addresses or other electronic contact information on the [shareholder
voting] list.").
27. See, for example, title 18, section 1056 of the Oklahoma Statutes that states that the
board of directors will determine the place of a meeting, if it is to have a place, and whether
shareholders may participate remotely. Id. § 1056(A)(1). If shareholders are to participate
remotely, the corporation must implement procedures for verifying a shareholder's identity, to
permit remote shareholders to "read or hear the proceedings" simultaneously, and for recording
shareholder votes. Id. § 1056(A)(2)(b).
28. Bylaw provisions often track the statutory language, especially regarding procedural
matters such as notices. Corporations should amend bylaws tracking the former statutes to
reflect the recent statutory changes. For example, bylaws referring to communication "in
writing" must be expanded to include e-mails. Bylaw references to a meeting "place" must be
amended if a meeting is to have no physical location.
29. A May 23,2003, search of the SEC's online database (Edgar) through the Edgar Online
search engine reflects that, since January 1, 2003, 248 companies filed proxy statements
disclosing electronic voting arrangements for their annual meetings and seventy companies filed
proxy statements disclosing webcast arrangements for their annual meetings. Edgar Online,
http://www.sec.gov (last visited May 23, 2003).
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written consents have hardly replaced actual meetings. 30 Actual meetings at
which directors and shareholders are physically present continue to be the
predominant forum for the conduct of business, at least in publicly held
companies for which data is available. Like written consents, webcasts and
teleconferences will generally serve as a supplement to, rather than a
replacement of, actual meetings.
Similarly, voting and transmitting
shareholder communication by Internet, e-mail or facsimile do not replace
paper mailings. They supplement the paper mailings. By supplementing the
physical meeting or the paper mailings, corporations provide alternatives that
permit greater access to, and participation in, the governance process.
3
2. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. Fleming Companies '

The legislature changed the OGCA most notably in response to Fleming.
In that case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that shareholders could adopt
binding bylaws that restricted the board's ability to implement shareholder
rights' plans.3 2 Some legal experts felt that the Oklahoma court ruled
differently than the Delaware courts would have ruled under the same
circumstances.33 Fleming unsettled many people because it elevated the
30. Section 228 of the DGCL authorizes shareholder written consents. It was amended in
1967 to permit action by less than all shareholders, if authorized in the certificate of
incorporation. A 1969 amendment eliminated the need for charter authorization. After 1969,
the statute generally authorized shareholders holding a majority of shares to take action by
written consent without special charter or bylaw authorization. See RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL.,
1 FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 228 cmt. (4th ed., 2003). While
small, closely-held corporations often use written consents in lieu of meetings, the practice is
not common in publicly-held companies. For example, on Edgar Online search of the SEC's
online database (Edgar) shows that, from January 1, 2003, to May 23, 2003, 5038 companies
filed proxy statements for shareholder meetings while only 229 companies filed information
statements covering shareholder actions by written consent. The data suggests that publicly held
companies will continue to value physical shareholder meetings even though other alternatives
are available.
31. 1999 OK 3, 975 P.2d 907.
32. Id. 25, 975 P.2d at 913.
33. See, e.g., John C. Coates & Bradley C. Faris, Second GenerationShareholderBylaws:
Post Quickum Alternatives, 56 Bus. LAW. 1323, 1328-29 & nn.25, 27, 28, 21, 31 (2001);
Charles F. Richards, Jr. & Robert J. Steam, Jr., ShareholderBy-Laws Requiring Boards of
Directors to Dismantle Rights PlansAre Unlikely to Survive Scrutiny Under Delaware Law,
54 Bus. LAW. 607, 631-34 (1999). The Delaware Supreme Court has written, "One of the most
basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation. Section 141 (a) requires
that any limitation on the board's authority be set out in the certificate of incorporation."
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998). Section 141 of the
DGCL is identical to section 1028 of the OGCA. The Fleming opinion ignores this "basic
tenet," suggesting instead - with no statutory authority - that a limitation on the shareholders'
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shareholders' authority over the authority of the corporate bylaws and the
board of the directors.34 Some commentators generally viewed the decision
as impinging on the statutory management prerogatives of the directors and
risking shareholder action unconstrained by the directors' fiduciary
obligations.35
The Fleming decision presented several problems. First, the court's attempt
at statutory reconciliation was unconvincing. Further, the court omitted
fundamental corporate governance concepts under Delaware law, such as the
board of directors' authority to manage and the role of fiduciary duties in
corporate action.36 Finally, with its decision, the court overlooked a genuine
opportunity to determine the boundaries of director and shareholder authority

power to adopt bylaws should be set forth in the certificate of incorporation. Fleming, 126, 975
P.2d at 913. For additional discussion on this point, see infra note 36.
34. Richards & Steam, supra note 33, at 631-34.
35. Shortly before the Fleming decision, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Quickturn,
which involved a board's attempt to use a shareholder rights' plan when confronted with a
hostile takeover. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1287. The Delaware court struck the plan, which
contained a provision preventing any subsequent board from eliminating the rights for six
months. Id. at 1290-92. The Delaware court wrote that a contract provision cannot limit a
board's ability to act in the shareholders' best interests. Id. at 1292. The holding suggests that
the Delaware court would not uphold a shareholder bylaw that materially restricted a board's
ability to implement, maintain, or redeem a rights plan. See Coates & Faris, supra note 33, at
1328-35.
36. The opinion, for example, fails to reconcile its holding with the vested managerial
authority of the board of directors under title 18, section 1027 of the Oklahoma Statutes or with
the provisions of section 1038 that direct that the creation and issuance of stock rights and
options conform to requirements set forth in the certificate of incorporation or "in a resolution
adopted by the board of directors." Section 1027 contains no reference to the shareholders or
to the bylaws. The opinion analogizes the rights plans to stock options, which ignores the
different contexts in which each is employed. Fleming, 18, 975 P.2d at 911. It cites an
Internal Revenue Code requirement that shareholders approve incentive stock options
(following board approval) as support for the notion that shareholders can limit the board's
authority. Id. 21, 975 P.2d at 911-12. The Court's purpose in citing the Internal Revenue
Code is unclear. The OGCA and the Code are not linked in any way. Each act is presumably
independent of the other. If cited for the notion that shareholders typically approve stock
options, the notion is flawed. The Code requires shareholder approval of a certain type of
option - incentive stock option - but these options are only one kind of stock option. There
are many kinds of options, and shareholder approval is not a prerequisite for their issuance. See,
e.g., 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1038 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 157 (2001 & Supp. 2002)).
Director authorization is typically required. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1038; DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8,
§ 157.
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under Oklahoma law.37 Unfortunately, the opinion confounded this latter
issue, and, as suggested in the opinion itself,38 necessitated legislative action.
The Oklahoma legislature responded to Fleming by enacting Senate Bill
610, which altered section 1013 of the OGCA by vesting the presumptive
authority to adopt or amend a corporation's bylaws with directors, rather than
shareholders." Section 1013 permits shareholders to amend the bylaws only
if authorized by the certificate of incorporation, and then, only if the
authorization does not divest or limit the directors' authority.4 °
3. Statutory Conversions
Notably, Senate Bill 610 also included the adoption of "conversion"
provisions in the OGCA,41 the LLC Act,4 2 and RULPA. 43 The legislature
modeled its statutory conversion provisions after the recent Delaware
conversion provisions." These provisions permit: (1) a "business entity" 45 to
convert to a domestic corporation; (2) a domestic corporation to convert to a
business entity; and (3) one type of business entity to convert to another type
of business entity.' A corporation can authorize a conversion by a vote of its
37. To explore the issue further, if in somewhat of an academic vein, see Ronald J. Gilson,
Unocal Fifteen Years Later(and What We Can DoAbout It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 491 (2001),
suggesting that shareholders be allowed to amend or repeal a shareholder rights plan by bylaw
amendment. Id.at 507-12. Contra Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills,Polls andProfessors:
A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 1 (2002). For a response to Lipton and
Rowe, see RONALD J. GILSON, LIPTON AND ROWE's APOLOGIA FOR DELAWARE: A SHORT REPLY

(Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 197,
2001), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edullaw-economicstudies/papers/wp197.pdf
(Dec. 2001).
38. Fleming, 26, 975 P.2d at 913. After examining the OGCA and finding no statutory
limits on shareholder bylaws and noting that Fleming Companies' charter "does not offer
directors th[e] broad authority to protect against mergers and takeover, corporations must look
to Oklahoma's legislature, not this Court, which is more properly vested with the means to offer
boards such authority." Id.
39. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1013 (2001).
40. Id. § 1013(A).
41. Id. §§ 1090.4-.5.
42. Id. §§ 2054.1-.2.
43. 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 310.2-.3 (2001).
44. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, §17-217 (Supp. 2002) (conversions involving limited
partnerships); id. §18-216 (conversions involving LLCs); tit. 8, §§ 265-266 (conversions
involving corporations).
45. A "business entity" is defined as a domestic general or limited partnership; LLC;
business or common law trust; or other unincorporated association. 18 OKLA. STAT.
§§1090.4(A), 2054.1(A) (2001); 54 OKLA. STAT. § 310.2(A) (2001).
46. 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1090.4-.5 (2001) (conversions involving corporations); id. §§
2054.1-.2 (conversions involving LLCs); 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 310.2-.3 (2001) (conversions
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board of directors and all of its shareholders, including holders of non-voting
stock.47 A business entity can authorize a conversion by following procedures
described in its governing documents, or if no procedures exist, by a vote of
a majority of its owners.4" The conversion becomes effective when the
converting entity files certificates of conversion and incorporation with the
Secretary of State.49
A statutory conversion operates much like a merger, although the
transaction involves only a single party.5" The conversion does not alter the
prior obligations or liabilities of the converting entity or the personal liability
incurred by any person in the entity before the conversion.5 The preconversion and post-conversion entities are deemed to be one and the same.52
The existence of the post-conversion entity relates back to the formation of the
pre-conversion entity,5 3 and neither is labeled a predecessor or successor
entity.54
The availability of a statutory conversion permits an entity to change its
form without a merger or the attendant need to create a shell entity.
Conversions will prove helpful for entities merely wanting to change their
form. Mergers will continue to be used for combinations involving two or
more groups.55
4. Other Changes in Senate Bill 610
Senate Bill 610 also instituted an annual certificate requirement for LLCs
and limited partnerships.56 The certificate is due each July 1 and requires an
involving limited partnerships).
47. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1090.5(B) (2001).
48. Id. § 1090.4(G) (referring to approval procedures in governing documents or by
applicable law); id. § 2054.2 (for LLCs, stating that approval is as required by the operating
agreement, or if not specified, by a majority vote of the members); 54 OKLA. STAT. § 310.3
(2001) (for limited partnerships, stating that approval is as required by the partnership
agreement, or if not specified, by all general partners and a majority of the limited partners by
interest).
49. 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1007(D), 1090.4.(B) (2001) (for corporations); id. § 2054.1(B) (for
LLCs); 54 OKLA. STAT. § 310.2(B) (2001) (for limited partnerships).
50. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1090.4(B) (2001) (for corporations); id. § 2054.1(B) (for LLCs); 54
OKLA. STAT. § 310.2(B) (2001) (for limited partnerships).
51. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1090.4(E) (2001).
52. Id. § 1090.4(D) (for corporations); id. § 2054.1(D) (for LLCs); 54 OKLA. STAT. §
310.2(D) (2001) (for limited partnerships).
53. Id. § 1090.4(D).
54. Id.
55. FAUGHT, supra note 2, § 8.2, at 8-5.
56. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 2055.2 (2001) (for LLCs); 54 OKLA. STAT. § 311.1 (2001) (for
limited partnerships).
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annual fee. 7 An LLC or limited partnership that fails to file will terminate its
good standing and will be cancelled after three years.58 The legislature
intended the change to purge dormant entities from the Secretary of State's
records. 59 The annual report requirement introduces for the first time the
concept of "good standing" to LLCs and limited partnerships.
The new LLC and limited partnership good standing and suspension
provisions are much less penal than the provisions covering corporations.
When a corporation is suspended, its directors and officers become personally
liable for debts incurred with their knowledge, approval and consent during
the suspension.60 Even if the corporation is later restored to good standing, the
personal liability remains.6 A corporation cannot defend itself while
suspended.62 The enforceability of contracts made during suspension has been

57. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 2055.2(B) (2001) (for LLCs); 54 OKLA. STAT. § 311.1 (B) (2001) (for
limited partnerships). The Secretary of State charges a $25 fee for LLCs under title 18, section
1 142(A)(1) and a $50 fee for limited partnerships under title 54, section 3 14(C)(2).
58. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 2055.2(D)-(E) (2001) (for LLCs); 54 OKLA. STAT. § 311 (B) (2001)
(for limited partnerships). An entity is in "good standing" if it has paid all fees required for its
maintenance. For example, an LLC must pay the $25 annual fee upon filing its annual
certificate. If the LLC relies upon the Secretary of State to act as its registered agent, it must pay
a $40 annual fee. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 2055.1 (2001). A corporation must file an annual franchise
tax return and pay its tax. 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1203, 1210 (2001). An entity failing to pay these
fees will cease to be in good standing, which means generally that it cannot make filings with
the Secretary of State and cannot maintain actions within the State. See, e.g., 18 OKLA. STAT.
§ 2055.2(F)-(G) (2001) (penalties for LLCs); 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1212 (2001) (penalties for
corporations). In addition, a corporation not in good standing cannot defend against actions,
and its officers and directors can be personally liable for debts incurred while it is not in good
standing. Id. § 1212(c); Corman v. H-30 Drilling, Inc., 2001 OK 92, 40 P.3d 1051 (dealing
with corporation's ability to defend an action); K.J. McNitt Constr., Inc. v. Economopoulos,
2001 OK CIV APP 45, 23 P.3d 983 (dealing with director and officer liability).
An LLC that has ceased to be in good standing can restore its good standing if it files its
annual certificates and pays all amounts due within three years of its delinquency. 18 OKLA.
STAT. § 2055.2(E) (2001). After three years, the Secretary of State will terminate the LLC and
its existence cannot be restored. Id. A corporation that has ceased to be in good standing can
be restored by filing its returns and paying its delinquent taxes. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1212(f)
(2001). After three years, the corporation is no longer entitled to use its earlier name if the name
had become available. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1120(F) (2001).
59. Synopsis of Senate Bill 610 prepared by Gary W. Derrick and distributed to OGCA
members (on file with author).
60. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1212(c) (2001); Economopoulos, 2001 OK CIV APP 45, 23 P.3d
983.
61. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Giese, 1984 OK 28,1 4,681 P.2d 769,770 ("[R]einstatement
does not vitiate the officers' and directors' personal liability for debts knowingly incurred
during the period of suspension.").
62. Corman, 1 8, 40 P.3d at 1053.
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questioned. 63 By contrast, the suspension of an LLC or limited partnership
does not make the members, managers or partners personally liable for entity
obligations. 64 Although an LLC or partnership cannot maintain an action, it
can defend itself while suspended.6 5 The statute specifically provides that
contracts made during a suspension are enforceable.' In the authors' opinion,
the corporate approach is too penal. Imposing personal liability on directors
and officers and withholding a corporation's ability to defend against claims
seems to outweigh the State's need to collect franchise taxes, especially
considering that franchise taxes are much less than corporate income taxes, for
which similar enforcement provisions do not exist.67 Especially penal is the
law that directors and officers remain personally liable for debts incurred
during suspension even though the corporation restores its good standing.6 8
The legislature should reevaluate these laws and the underlying policies and
reform the corporate provisions to match the more balanced LLC and limited
partnership provisions. This and the conversion provisions of Senate Bill 610
may herald the start of more changes in the Oklahoma business entities laws
to eliminate unintended differences and their consequences. Overlapping and
conflicting provisions can complicate and confuse a practitioner's compliance
with the formalities of the various laws. Movement towards a more unified
business practice may be debated in future legislative sessions.
Other changes in the LLC Act include an expansion of the purpose section
to include nonbusiness activities,6 9 and changes authorizing the resignation of
a manager7" or member-manager, 7 and the addition of a section that permits
the delegation of responsibilities to others.7 This latter change is helpful
when a corporate structure is used in which the managers function as directors
and officers function as agents of the managers. The changes also permit the
63. Id.; Economopoulos, 5, 23 P.3d at 984.
64. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 2055.2(I) (2001).
65. Id. § 2055.2(G).
66. Id. § 2055.2(H).
67. In fiscal year 2001, Oklahoma collected $166.1 million in corporate income taxes
compared to $43.4 million in franchise taxes. Okla. Tax Comm'n, Annual Report of the
Oklahoma Tax Commission for Fiscal Year 2001, at 4, 9, availableat http://www.oktax.state.
ok.us/oktax/publicat/ar200l.pdf; see 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2375, 2376 (2001) (penalties relating
to corporate income taxes); Act of June 7, 2003, sec. 22, § 2385.3(E), 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws
ch. 472 (penalties relating to employee tax withholding that makes the entity and its responsible
officers or managers personally liable for the taxes, but not for all corporate obligations).
68. State Ins. Fund v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc., 1991 OK 42, 863 P.2d 1218; In re
Watson, 104 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1993).
69. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 2002 (2001).
70. Id. § 2014(3).
71. Id. § 2015(B).
72. Id. § 2016(3).
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LLC's operating agreement to define the scope of the manager's duties, and
provide that the business judgment rule, as it applies to corporate directors and
officers, also applies to LLC managers.73
Senate Bill 610 clarified the scope of exemption in title 68 that relates to
the documentary tax stamps on deeds.7" The legislature amended the wording
of the exemption to ensure that transfers between and among family members
or entities for the benefit of family members would not be subject to the tax.75
Senate Bill 610 clarified the application of the OGCA to cooperative
marketing associations, including foreign cooperatives doing business in
Oklahoma.76 Before this change, the Cooperative Marketing Association Act
had no provision authorizing foreign cooperatives to do business in Oklahoma.
The provision incorporating the OGCA as to matters not addressed by the
cooperative act appeared to cover only domestic cooperatives.77 The change
added language stating that the OGCA will apply to domestic and foreign
cooperatives. 7' This meant that foreign cooperatives could use the OGCA
domestication provisions to qualify to do business in Oklahoma.7 9
B. Other Legislative Noteworthy Changes
As the legislature amended the OGCA to recognize the use of electronic
communication for director and shareholder meetings, they also enacted
similar changes for filings by business entities. In 2000, Oklahoma adopted
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act."0 The UETA facilitates electronic
commerce by giving electronic records and signatures the legal equivalence
of paper writings and traditional signatures.8 In 2001, the legislature

73. Id. § 2016(4).
74. 68 OKLA.STAT. § 3202 (2001).
75. Id.
76. 2 OKLA. STAT. § 17-24 (2001).
77. Title 2, section 17-24 previously read: "The provisions of the general business
corporation laws of this state and all powers and rights thereunder shall apply to the
associationsorganized hereunder, except where such provisions are inconsistent with the
express provisions of this act." 2 OKLA. STAT. § 17-24 (2001) (emphasis added).
The 2002 amendments added a sentence reading: "The provisions of this act shall also apply
to similar associations organized under the laws of other jurisdictions and doing business or
seeking to do business in this state to the extent that this act applies to foreign corporations
doing business or seeking to do business in this state." 2 OKLA. STAT. § 17-24 (Supp. 2002).
78. Id.
79. See 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1130-1136 (2001).
80. 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws 2130 (codified as amended at 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 15-101 to
-121 (2001)).
81. See Fred H. Miller, Commentary on the Oklahoma Version of the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, reprintedin 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. art. 15 (West 2001).
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amended the UETA to implement the concept of a "certification authority" a person who certifies a digital signature. 2 This change facilitates the
electronic filing of legal documents in the courts, in real estate transactions,
and with the Secretary of State. 3 The UETA is a voluntary act. It does not
require that anyone accept an electronic signature.' Thus, businesses must
wait for court clerks, county clerks, and the Secretary of State to implement
systems to accept electronic filings.
The Secretary of State is currently implementing such a system that is
expected to be functional by the end of the 2003 calendar year. 85 The system
will allow Internet access to the Secretary of State's business entity database
to check name availability and good standing and to view constituent
documents.8 6 The system also will permit Internet filing of corporate, LLC,
limited partnership, and other
entity documents for formations, amendments,
8 7
mergers, and dissolutions.
III. Recent Oklahoma Decisions
The only notable cases in the general corporate area do not directly involve
the OGCA or the rights and duties of directors or shareholders. One case,

82. Act of May 31, 2001, ch. 282, § 1, 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 282, 2339 (codified at
12A OKLA. STAT. § 15-102 (2001) and id. § 8121).

83. Id. § 2(b), 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws at 2341 (codified at 12A OKLA. STAT. § 15-121(b)).
An electronic signature under the UETA is broadly inclusive. It might be a voice mail message,
a name on a facsimile or name on an e-mail. See 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 15-102 cmt. 7 (West

2001). While a broadly inclusive definition facilitates e-commerce, a greater degree of security
is warranted for documents having significant legal import, such as land records, court
documents and Secretary of State filings. The enhanced degree of security is provided by the
"certification authority," which will certify a "digital signature." A digital signature is narrowly
defined as an electronic signature that is encrypted in a way that permits the sender to be
distinguished from any other person. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 15-102(6) (2001). By using a
certification authority, land records, court documents and Secretary of State filings can be
transmitted electronically.
84.

12A OKLA. STAT. § 15-105(b) (2001).

85. The Secretary of State refers to the system as "SoonerAccess." See http://www.sos.
state.ok.us/sooner.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003). Information about implementation was
obtained by Gary W. Derrick in telephone interviews with Vickie Mitchell of the Secretary of
State's office. Telephone Interviews with Vickie Mitchell, Office of the Secretary of State of
Oklahoma (Feb. 21 & May 23, 2003).
86. See http://www.sos.state.ok.us/sooner.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
87. See id.
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CardiovascularSurgicalSpecialists, Corp.v. Mammana,8 principally affects
physicians' noncompete agreements.8 9 It also touches on the enforceability of
arbitration decisions. ° The other case, Winston v. Stewart & Elder, P.C.,9
involves the break-up of a professional corporation and the obligations owed
by the firm and the remaining lawyer/shareholders to the withdrawing
lawyer/shareholders. The Winston decision covers an appeal of a summary
judgment motion and never addresses directly the merits of the case.9 2
In Mammana, a professional corporation, Cardiovascular Surgical
Specialists (CSS), employed a Tulsa surgeon, Mammana, for about two
years. 93 Mammana's employment agreement contained a noncompete
provision.94 The surgeon later left CSS, but continued to work as a sole
practitioner.9 5
An arbitration panel held the noncompete provision valid and enforceable.'
CSS took the arbitration award to the district court, which "enjoined
Dr. Mammana from practicing... surgery within a twenty-mile radius of one
of CSS's offices." 97 Mammana appealed, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
retained the case to consider whether the noncompete provision was valid and
enforceable. 98
The court's opinion regarding the noncompete was predictable and

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

2002 OK 27, 61 P.3d 210.
Id. 12, 61 P.3d at 211.
Id. (I 10-13, 61 P.3d at 212-13.
2002 OK 68, 55 P.3d 1063.
Id. 00, 55 P.3d at 1064.
Mammana, 15, 61 P.3d at 212.
Id. 14, 61 P.3d at 212. The noncompete provision reads as follows:
During the term of the Agreement, and for two years thereafter, [the surgeon]
agrees that he will not ...within a twenty mile radius of [CSS's] offices:
A. own, operate, or in any way participate in the practice of cardiovascular or
thoracic surgery,
B. solicit, divert or accept referrals from any source of [CSS] referrals within
nine months of the date of termination,
C. solicit or divert business of any patient who had been a patient of [CSS]
within one year of the termination, without [CSS's] advanced written consent.
Id. 15, 61 P.3d at 213-14.
95. Id. 15, 61 P.3d at 212.
96. Id. 16,61 P.3d at 212.
97. Id. 17, 61 P.3d at 212.
98. Title 15, section 217 of the Oklahoma Statutes prohibits restraints of trade, which
includes unreasonable noncompete provisions. See Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 1989
OK 122, 780 P.2d 1168. The legislature amended the statute in 2001 to address noncompetes
in the employment context, but Mammana was decided under the prior statute. See 15 OKLA.
STAT. § 219A (2001).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:259

consistent with precedent.99 The court voided a clause that prohibited
Mammana from practicing cardiovascular or thoracic surgery within the
twenty-mile radius of one of CSS's offices." ° It also voided a clause
prohibiting Mammana from accepting patient referrals from sources that had
made referrals to CSS within nine months of Mammana's departure.''
The court stated that the practice prohibition was "much. broader than
necessary to protect any legitimate interest of CSS."'0 2 Regarding the referral
clause, the court wrote, "Ordinary competition for patients is something CSS
cannot avoid through a 'non-compete' provision. Evidence presented to the
arbitration panel demonstrated the personal nature of reputation-dependent
referrals to cardiovascular surgeons. One surgeon has no legitimate business
interest in another surgeon's referral base regardless of a past employeremployee relationship."' '
In striking these clauses, the court referred to earlier cases upholding "nonsolicitation" provisions, but not broader noncompetes, and to the notion that
noncompetes were only reasonable and enforceable to the extent that they
protected against "unfair competition.""
The court allowed a clause
prohibiting Mammana from soliciting CSS patients for one year unless he had
treated them and they had requested his continued service. 5 The court noted
that this clause was similar to provisions previously upheld. '06
The more surprising aspect of the court's decision was its voiding of the
arbitration award. Obviously, to void any of the noncompete clauses, the
court had to set aside the arbitration panel's determination that the clauses
were reasonable, and thus enforceable. Citing Wyatt-Doyle & Butler
Engineers, Inc. v. City of Eufaula,'"7 the court held that it could review the
validity of a contract even if an arbitration panel had already deemed it
99. Prior Oklahoma cases generally had upheld nonsolicitation clauses while striking
broader noncompete clauses. See Bayly, 19890K 122,780 P.2d 1168 (striking a noncompete);
Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 1970 OK 27, 465 P.2d 448 (upholding
nonsolicitation of former customers provision, constituting the first time an employment
restraint was upheld); Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 2000 OK CIV APP 109,
12 P.3d 977 (striking noncompete). Like Mammana, these cases dealt with employees who
posed little risk of unfair competition.
100. Mammana, 1 16, 61 P.3d at 214.
101. Id. 120, 61 P.3d at 215.
102. Id. 16, 61 P.3d at 214.
103. Id. 1 18, 61 P.3d at 214 (citation omitted).
104. Id. 14, 61 P.3d at 213.
105. Id. 19, 61 P.3d at 214.
106. Id. (citing Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 1970 OK 27, 465 P.2d
448 and Key Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Cox, 1994 OK CIV APP 123, 884 P.2d 1213).
107. 2000 OK 74, 13 P.3d 474. See infra note 146.
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valid. 08
' If the court determined that the contact was invalid, it could set aside
the arbitration award because the arbitrators "'exceeded their powers' in
attempting to enforce an invalid contract. 109
The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) that Oklahoma has adopted, permits
the court to vacate an award only on narrow grounds." 0 In most jurisdictions,
a court's review of an arbitration decision is not de novo, but rather, the award
is presumed proper. "' Yet, the Oklahoma Supreme Court gave no weight to
108. Mammana, 11, 61 P.3d at 213.
109. Id. TI 10, 13, 61 P.3d at 212-13.
110. Title 15, section 812 of the Oklahoma Statutes sets forth the grounds upon which an
arbitration award might be vacated:
A. Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award if:
1. The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other illegal means;
2. There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any
party;
3. The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
4. The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being
shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or
otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the requirements of this act, as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
5. There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 3 of this act and the party did not
participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection.
B. The fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted
by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the
award.
15 OKLA. STAT. § 812 (2001) (citation omitted).
111. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987) ("[Ilt is the
arbitrator's view of the facts... that [the parties have] agreed to accept" and the "[c]ourts thus
do not sit to hear claims of factual . . . error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in
reviewing decisions of lower courts."); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757,
764 (1983) ("[A] federal court may not overrule an arbitrator's decision simply because the
court believes its own interpretation of the contract would be the better one."); Saturday
Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1197 (7th Cir. 1987); Parsons &
Whittemore Ala. Mach. & Servs. Corp. v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 744 F.2d 1482, 1484 (11 th Cir.
1984); Coast Trading Co. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1982); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local Union No. 7001, 588 F.2d 127, 128 (5th
Cir. 1978); see also Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1993)
(finding a public policy exception to the enforcement of an arbitrator's decision). The public
policy exception might appear at first blush to support the Mammana decision. A closer
examination reveals that any support is illusory. The public policy exception is too narrow to
support a recasting of the arbitrator's factual determinations. "A court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the arbitrator. Nor may a court decide facts to support its public policy
views." Kennicott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999) (public
policy exception will not permit a court to overturn an arbitrator's refusal to allow dismissal of
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the arbitration award. It seemingly applied a de novo standard and substituted
its own factual determinations in deciding whether the noncompete provisions
were reasonable for the determinations of the arbitration panel." 2
The decision is problematic for arbitration. If a court may apply a de novo
standard of review to arbitration awards, then by recasting facts it can
determine, in many cases, that the arbitrators have exceed their powers. A
determination that the arbitration award was contrary to a contract or to a
statute would suffice. The result amounts to ajudicial second-guessing of the
arbitration award.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also decided Winston v. Stewart & Elder,
P.C.113 Winston involved the break-up of a professional corporation (PC).
Two lawyer/shareholders left in 1994, triggering a buyout of their shares
under their shareholder agreements." 4 The two remaining lawyer/shareholders dissolved the PC and formed a new PC at year-end." 5 The new PC
had substantially the same name, the same location and the same practice." 6
While it appears to have assumed the other liabilities of the former PC, the
new PC did not assume the old PC's buyout obligation. 1"' The former
lawyer/shareholders sued for the balance due in their buyout. "8
As the court wrote, "The [case history] is rather convoluted ."''" After the
plaintiffs sued, the defendant law firm answered timely in October 1995.20
The trial court appointed a receiver who completed his work and was

an employee involved in an accident and who failed a contemporaneous drug test).
112. The case upon which the court relied, Wyatt-Doyle, involved an engineering firm's
claim against a municipality that had guaranteed a trust authority's performance under some
industrial revenue bonds. An arbitration panel found the municipality liable, and the firm
attempted to enforce its award. Wyatt-Doyle,1 3,13 P.3d at 475. Wyatt-Doyle appealed to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Wyatt-Doyle court set aside the arbitration award holding that
the municipality was constitutionally prohibited from performing its guarantee. Id. 1 16, 13
P.3d at 479.
Whether one agrees with the Wyatt-Doyle court's holding, it was based on a contract that
the court held was invalid as a matter of law. The noncompetes in Mammana could only be
invalidated by a factual determination that the noncompetes were unreasonable. If a court may
freely substitute both its legal and factual determinations for those of an arbitration panel, little
accord is left for an award.
113. 2002 OK 68, 55 P.3d 1063.
114. Id. 10 , 55 P.3d at 1065.
115. Id. 4, 55 P.3d at 1066.
116. Id.
117. Id. 14-5, 55 P.3d at 1066-67.
118. Id. 5, 55 P.3d at 1066.
119. Id. 2, 55 P.3d at 1067.
120. Id. 7, 55 P.3d at 1067.
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discharged in November 1996.121 The plaintiffs sought to amend their petition
in July 1998.122 In September 1998, the trial court denied the plaintiffs leave
to amend and allowed the remaining defendants to answer the original
petition. 123 In April 2000, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for
12
summary judgment and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 1
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary
125
judgment and the defendants appealed.
The plaintiffs' status after terminating their employment was an apparent
point of confusion.126 Did they remain shareholders after ceasing to be
employees? The distinction is critical. If the plaintiffs are shareholders, their
claims would arise out of a fiduciary relationship. 12 If the plaintiffs are not
shareholders, their claims arise out of a creditor-debtor relationship. 2 As the

121. Id. 16, 55 P.3d at 1067.
122. Id. 17, 55 P.3d at 1067.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. 1 8, 55 P.3d at 1067.
126. Id. 118, 55 P.3d at 1070.
127. The directors and officers of a corporation (presumably the individual defendants) owe
fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty to the shareholders. The duty of care requires that the
director conduct himself or herself with the same care that an ordinarily prudent director would
exercise in like circumstances. The duty of loyalty requires that the director elevate the interests
of the corporation above his or her own self-interest. See generally PAT K. CHEW, DIRECTORS'
AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY 2.4 (2001) (duty of care); id. at 4-2 (duty of loyalty). In instances of
self-dealing, the majority shareholders might owe fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders.
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). These concepts would permit
plaintiffs - as shareholders - to sue the individual defendants personally.
128. If plaintiffs are creditors instead of shareholders, they must use different bases to reach
the defendants. In most cases, the directors of a corporation owe no fiduciary duties to a
creditor. The creditor could sue the corporation on its account. It could not sue a director.
There are exceptions. A director owes a fiduciary duty to corporate creditors if the corporation
is insolvent. See, e.g., Union Coal Co. v. Wooley, 1915 OK 992, 154 P. 62; see also Gregory
V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially
Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAW. 215 (1992) (for a broader and more current discussion of the
fiduciary duties directors owe to creditors). A creditor could also reach a successor corporation - such as the new PC - in certain situations, such as when the successor is a mere
continuation of the old corporation. See, e.g., Okla. Title Co. v. Burrus, 1935 OK 495,44 P.2d
852. A creditor could also reach the successor corporation, and the individual defendants to the
extent of a benefit received, under fraudulent conveyance theories. See e.g., In re Honey Creek
Entr't, Inc., 246 B.R. 671 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2000), rev'd on other grounds,Nos. 01-7052,
01-7059, 2002 WL 1265630 (10th Cir. June 7, 2002); Rucks-Brandt Constr. Corp. v. Silver,
1944 OK 215, 151 P.2d 399; Sec. Nat'l Bank of Tulsa v. Cain, 1927 OK 98, 259 P. 572;
Skirvin Operating Co. v. S.W. Elec. Co., 1918 OK 503, 174 P. 1069.
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129
court correctly notes, the answer (no) was in the shareholder agreement.
Yet, plaintiffs themselves advanced positions premised on their continued
shareholder status' and the trial court's order discharging the receiver
presumed that the plaintiffs were shareholders over a year after their
termination. 3'
After correctly resolving the plaintiffs' status, the court resolved procedural
issues regarding the maintenance of an action against a dissolved corporation
and the plaintiffs' right to amend its petition. 32 But, perhaps due to the
convoluted nature of the case, the most interesting issue was not before the
Court and thus was not addressed. The crux of the case is the validity of the
dissolution of the old PC, the contemporaneous formation of the new PC, and
the transfer of assets from the old PC to the new PC. The transaction is daring
at best. 33 The transaction poses nettlesome conflicts of interest. The
individual defendants owned and operated both the old and the new PCs. In
the dissolution and transfer of assets, they controlled both buyer and seller and
thus determined the price of the transferred assets. Perhaps most importantly,
since the old PC was "no longer a viable economic entity," they owed

129. The plaintiffs were party to a shareholder agreement that required them to sell their
shares a price determined under the agreement if their employment terminated. Winston, '120,
55 P.3d at 1070.
130. While parties at times advance inconsistent positions given the vagaries of litigation,
the plaintiffs' failure to adopt a consistent position was noted by the court and may have
contributed to the trial court's confusion. Id 18, 55 P.3d at 1070 ("the confusion [about
whether plaintiffs stand as shareholders or creditors] is apparent from the face of plaintiffs'
petition .... "). The inconsistency was still present three years later when plaintiffs sought to
amend their petition to allege that "[the individual defendants] breached the fiduciary duties
owed by majority shareholders to minority shareholders." Id. 17, 55 P.3d at 1067.
131. The trial court's order discharging the receiver treats the plaintiffs as shareholders of
the old PC. Id. I 6, 19, 55 P.3d at 1067, 1070. The discharge order was entered in November
1996. The plaintiffs had resigned in 1994. Id. IN 3, 6, 55 P.3d at 1066-67.
132. The defendants argued that the order discharging the receiver was a final, unappealable
order that dissolved the old PC and mooted any claims against it. The argument flies in the face
of title 18, section 1099 of the Oklahoma Statutes that continues the existence of a dissolving
corporation until all pending proceedings against it conclude. The court so held and reversed
the trial court. Id. Iff 11-17, 55 P.3d at 1068-69. The court also reversed the trial court to
permit the plaintiffs to amend their petition. Id. 1 24, 55 P.3d at 1070-72.
133. The notion that a successor corporation could be liable for the antecedent obligations
of its predecessor was well established early in Oklahoma jurisprudence. See Okla. Title Co.
v. Burrus, 1935 OK 495, 44 P.2d 852; Sec. Nat'l Bank of Tulsa v. Cain, 1927 OK 98, 259 P.
572; Spring Creek Oil Corp. v. Dillman, 1923 OK 324, 215 P. 1053; Burkholder v. Okmulgee
Coal Co., 1921 OK 84, 196 P. 679; Skirvin Operating Co. v. S.W. Elec. Co., 1918 OK 503,174
P. 1069; Union Coal Co. v. Wooley, 1915 OK 992, 154 P. 62. Of these cases, all but Union
Coal involved related party transfers similar to that in Winston. In every case, the successor
corporation was liable to the creditor of the predecessor.
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fiduciary duties not to themselves as shareholders, but to the creditors of the
old PC.'34 Sustaining the fairness of the transaction to these creditors including the former shareholders - would have presented a steep, if not
35
insurmountable, burden.
It is regrettable that the transaction was not squarely at issue and discussed.
Few Oklahoma cases have discussed the fiduciary obligations of directors,
officers and shareholders generally. 36 Even fewer have discussed the duties
that directors owe to creditors in an insolvent corporation.' 37 It would have
been interesting to examine what steps, if any, the individual defendants took
to ameliorate their conflict of interest or to examine their methods of assigning
38
value to the assets, including the work-in-progress and the firm's goodwill. 1
Dealing with corporate conflicts of interest has been the subject of many cases
and treatises for many years, but comparatively little caselaw exists in
134. See, e.g., Wooley, 1915 OK992, 154 P. 62; see also Varallo &Finkelstein, supra note
128.
135. In Warren v. CenturyBankcorporation,Inc., 1987 OK 14,741 P.2d 846, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court addressed the conflicts that a parent corporation faces in dealing with its 80%owned subsidiary and held the parent corporation to a higher standard: the parent's dealing
must be "intrinsically fair" to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary. Assuming the
individual defendants owed fiduciary duties to plaintiffs as creditors, the higher standard of the
"intrinsic fairness" test would presumably apply.
136. The cases discussing the fiduciary duties of Oklahoma directors are Hoye v. Meek, 795
F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Oklahoma law); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Wright, 868 F.
Supp. 301 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (applying Oklahoma law); Gay v. Akin, 1988 OK 150, 766 P.2d
985; Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 1987 OK 14, 741 P.2d 846; Schroeder v.
Sanford-FeltInvestment Co., 1936 OK 288,57 P.2d 601, Gainesv. GainesBros. Co., 1936 OK
113, 56 P.2d 863; McKee v. InterstateOil & Gas Co., 1920 OK 8, 188 P. 109; Union Coal Co.
v. Wooley, 1915 OK 992, 154 P. 62; and Preston-ThomasConstruction,Inc. v. CentralLeasing,
1973 OK CIV APP 10, 518 P.2d 1125.
137. The court affirmed the defendants' summary judgment motion as to the new PC.
Winston, 20, 55 P.3d at 1070-71. Its affirmation appears premised on the belief that the
plaintiffs could not state a claim against the new PC since the plaintiffs were not shareholders
of the new PC and thus lacked standing. Id. The affirmation is perplexing. The Winston facts
afford the plaintiffs an ample basis for asserting - as creditors of the old PC - successor
liability against the new PC. The notion that a successor corporation could be liable for the
antecedent obligations of its predecessor was well established early in Oklahoma jurisprudence.
See Okla. Title Co. v. Burrus, 1935 OK 495, 44 P.2d 852; Spring Creek Oil Corp. v. Dillman,
1923 OK 324, 215 P. 1053; Burkholder v. Okmulgee Coal Co., 1921 OK 84, 196 P. 679;
Skirvin Operating Co. v. S.W. Elec. Co., 1918 OK 503, 174 P. 1069; Union Coal Co. v.
Wooley, 1915 OK 992, 154 P. 62. Of these cases, all but Union Coal involved related party
transfers similar to that in Winston.
138. One would expect the conflicts of interest and valuation issues to arise in a trial on the
merits. The case was on appeal from a denial of summary judgment and other preliminary
rulings. Neither the conflicts of interest nor the valuation issues were before the Winston Court
and its opinion does not address these issues.
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Oklahoma. 39 The assignment of values, particularly in professional
corporations, is a subject that arises with some frequency in Oklahoma. 4 °
Yet, clear guidance is wanting.' 4 ' Perhaps, the Court will address these issues
139. The means of dealing with conflicts of interest are many. For a discussion of the
historical development, see Harold Marsh, Jr., Are DirectorsTrustees? Conflict of Interestand
CorporateMorality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966). Common means might involve the use of
independent experts to handle the valuation of assets or to opinion as to the fairness of the
transaction, the retention of independent legal counsel for the old PC, or the appointment of a
special committee to represent the old PC in structuring the transaction. See Lou R. KLING &
EILEEN NUGENT SIMON, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES,

SUBSIDIARIES AND

DIVISIONS § 22.04[2] (2001 ed.) (regarding use of fairness opinions); In re Fort Howard Corp.,

No. Civ. A 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 at *36 (Del.Ch. 1988) (regarding importance of
independent legal counsel); Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (regarding use of
special committees); Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee EnsuringBusinessJudgmentRule Protectionin the Context ofManagementLeveragedBuyouts
and Other Corporate TransactionsInvolving Conflicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAW. 665 (1988).
The only Oklahoma case discussing the directors' standards in conflict of interest transactions
at length is Warren v. Century Bankcorporation,Inc., 1987 OK 14,741 P.2d 846, in which the
Oklahoma Supreme Court established the "intrinsic fairness" test for judging the validity of
conflicts of interest transactions. Id. TI 7-8, 741 P.2d at 849.
140. Valuation is most frequently discussed in divorce proceedings. See Musser v. Musser,
1995 OK 116, 909 P.2d 37 (law practice); Traczyk v. Traczyk, 1995 OK 22, 891 P.2d 1277
(medical practice); Mocnik v. Mocnik, 1992 OK 99,.838 P.2d 500 (medical practice); Ford v.
Ford, 1988 OK 103,766 P.2d 950 (law practice); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 1983 OK 2, 657 P.2d
646 (medical practice); Casey v. Casey, 1993 OK CIV APP 129, 860 P.2d 807 (law practice);
and Ford v. Ford, 1992 OK CIV APP 123, 840 P.2d 36 (law practice). All of these cases deal
with the valuation of professional practices in a divorce context.
141. The clearest and best expression of valuation considerations in Oklahoma appears in
King v. Southwestern Cotton Oil Co., 1978 OK CIV APP 19, 585 P.2d 385, a corporate
appraisal proceeding for the valuation of dissenting shares. The King case describes the
traditional methods for valuing a business: net asset value, investment (or capitalized earnings)
value and market value. Id.TI 14-16, 585 P.2d at 389-90. The use of these methods conforms
to Delaware law. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
The guidance from divorce proceedings offers little utility to other areas. Divorce
proceedings often involve a division of property and an alimony or child support award. If the
property includes a service business (such as a professional practice), the valuation of the
divided property overlaps with the alimony or child support award, which is based on the
monthly income. In other words, the value of a service business is largely based on the value
of the labor inputs. The labor inputs also generate the alimony or child support payments.
While no case has attempted to analyze this overlap, the overlap has been acknowledged in the
context of whether the goodwill of a professional practice should be included in a valuation of
the property to be divided. In Travis v. Travis, 1990 OK 57, 795 P.2d 96, the Court noted that
goodwill should not be included, for among other reasons that inclusion of goodwill - which
is linked to future revenues - would amount to a "double counting" when combined with
alimony. Id. T 7-8, 795 P.2d at 99. It thus accepted that goodwill should not be included in
valuing a professional practice. Id. 1 13, 795 P.2d at 100. Travis's application, however,
should be limited to divorces in which alimony or child support awards are made. As an
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if the case's convoluted path winds around to that resort again.
IV. Developments in CorporateResponsibility Law
A. General
As a general rule, corporate governance is the prerogative of state
legislation and state common law. ,4 2 State corporation statutes specifically
address the ways corporations handle their internal affairs.' 43 Indeed,
"[m]odern corporate statutes place greater reliance on fiduciary duty concepts
as a means of regulating director and officer actions and less reliance on
statutory restrictions."'" Interpretation and evolution of these duties depend
on state court review and oversight in areas of responsibility, liability, duty of
care and loyalty -including conflicts of interest, negligence, and misconduct.
However, the federal government also took major steps to influence
corporate governance matters during the last year. In response to the major
scandals surrounding the bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom, and Global
Crossing, the activity on Capitol Hill in 2002 was fast and furious.
Early in 2002, eleven separate congressional committees and subcommittees began investigating the situation surrounding the Enron bankruptcy.
The senators and congressmen held their hearings, brought in victims and
expert witnesses, and received considerable press coverage.' 45
The result was the broad Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA) that was
signed into law on July 30, 2002. "4Congress intended the Act "to address the
systematic and structural weaknesses affecting our capital markets which were
revealed by repeated failures of audit effectiveness and corporate . . .

(intangible) asset, goodwill is and should be included in a calculation of the net asset value of
any business, including a professional corporation. Accord Freeling v. Wood, 1961 OK 113,
361 P.2d 1061 (goodwill should be included in valuing interest of deceased partner); see Rev.
Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327 (describing standards for calculating the value of goodwill).
142. FAUGHT, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 6-2.1.
143. Title 18, section 1013 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that the bylaws (the internal
operating rules of the corporation) may contain any provision relating to the conduct of the
affairs of the corporation not inconsistent with law or the certificate of incorporation. 18 OKLA.
STAT. § 1013(B) (2001). Pursuant to the Internal Affairs Doctrine that only one state should
have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs, a foreign corporation's internal
affairs are usually governed by the law of its jurisdiction of incorporation. FAUGHT, supra note
2, § 11.103, 11:3.
144. FAUGHT, supra note 2, 6.102, at 6-3.
145. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002); H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 27 (2002).
146. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.).
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responsibility."' 47 Many felt that systemic problems existed in corporate
disclosure in general, and specifically in accounting and corporate
responsibility.' 48
B. ProvisionsApplying to Publicly Held Corporations
The SOA focuses primarily on publicly held corporations.' 49 While the
SOA involves many reform subjects, this Article will briefly reference only
sections that deal directly with the impact of the legislation on corporate
governance. Congress gave great ,authority to the SEC to enact rules and
regulations implementing the SOA; 5 ° and no study of the SOA is complete
without reference to such regulations.
The SOA sets forth standards relating to a public company's audit
committee. Under the Act, an audit committee is directly responsible for the
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of the auditors.' 5 '
Further, each member of the audit committee must be a member of the board
of directors and be otherwise independent.'5 2 Independent means that the
member may not accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee
from the company, or be an affiliated person of the company or any
subsidiary. '5

147. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2.
148. See SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: LAW AND EXPLANATION (2002), containing
portions of the following remarks: 148 CONG REC. S6330-33 (July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes); 148 CONG. REC. S6437 (July 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Daschle); 148 CONG. REC.
56437, 6439-40 (July 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 148 CONG. REc. S6528-29 (July 10,
2002) (statement of Sen. McCain); 148 CONG. REc. 56445 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Edwards); 148 CONG. REc. S6545 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lott); 148 CONG. REC.
S6565 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin); 148 CONG. REC. S6687 (July 12, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Carnahan); 148 CONG. REc. H1545 (Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Oxley); 148 CONG. REc. H1548-49 (Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Roukema); 148 CONG.
REC. H4684-85 (July 16, 2002) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
149. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 1.
150. SEC Disclosure in Management's D&A About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and
Aggregate Contractual Obligations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 249 (2003); SEC Retention of
Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2003); SEC Disclosure Required
by § 406 and § 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 249 (2003);
SEC Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240,245,249 (2003);
SEC Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 17
C.F.R. §§ 210,240,249,274 (2003); SEC Implementing of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003); SEC Regulation Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. § 242
(2003).
151. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Because of the congressional perception that recent corporate failures have
resulted from defects in procedures for monitoring financial results and
controls, the SOA contains a number of provisions aimed at increasing the
direct responsibility of senior corporate managers. 54 The SEC requires CEOs
and CFOs, or persons performing similar functions, to certify that the officer
signing the financial report made to the SEC has reviewed it, and that, based
on the signing officers' knowledge, the report does not contain any
misstatement or omission, and fairly presents the financial condition and
results of operations.' 55 The Act also requires the signing officers to certify
that they are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls,
that such controls ensure that proper information reaches the right people, and
that the signing officers have evaluated the effectiveness of the controls within
ninety days prior to the report.'5 6
The SOA also makes it unlawful for any officer or director to take any
action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead an accounting
firm conducting an audit for the corporation.'
The Act further prohibits
officers from benefitting from profits they receive as a result of misstatements
of the company's financial reports.'
The SOA facilitates the imposition of
judicial bars against officers and directors who have violated securities laws,
and prevents employers from requiring employees to hold company stock in
their retirement accounts while officers and directors are free to sell their
shares.' 59 The SOA also enhances certain conflict of interest provisions by
prohibiting certain personal loans from public companies to their
executives. 6 '
C. ProvisionsApplying to All Corporations
Although the SOA primarily targets public reporting companies, some of
its provisions also apply to private corporations. These provisions are as
16 1
follows:
154. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2.

155. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(l)-(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(1)-(3)).
156. Id. § 302(a)(4)(A)-(C) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (a)(4)(A)-(C)).
157. Id. § 303(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a)).

158. Id. § 304(a)(2) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(2)).
159. Id. §§ 305-306 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d), 7244; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021,
1132).

160. Id. § 402(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)).
161. This list of the SOA sections was identified in Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Summary of
Provisions, a report prepared by Bob Shepler for Financial Executives International (FEI).
Information about the report is available at http://www.fei.org/advocacy/sarbanesoxley.cfm
(click on FEI's Bob Shepler Outlines the Provisions, http://www.fei.org/download/

shepleranalyze.pdf).
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(1) The SOA requires employers to give employees thirty-day
advance
62
written or electronic notice of any pension-fund blackout period. 1
(2) The SOA amends federal law to provide new penalties for the
destruction, alteration, or falsification ofrecords in federal investigations and
bankruptcies. 63 Penalties for such actions shall include up to twenty years
imprisonment, fines, or both."' Further, the Act requires any accountant that
conducts an audit of any issuer to retain all audit or review paperwork for a
period of five years. 6 Penalties for violations include imprisonment up to ten
years, fines, or both."
(3) The SOA provides that any person who attempts to commit crimes
under the title can be treated as if they had committed the crime.' 67
(4) The SOA increases the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud from
five to twenty years imprisonment.t61
(5) The SOA changes the penalty structure for violations of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The maximum penalty for
individual violations increased from a five-thousand dollar to a one-hundredthousand dollar fine, and from one year to ten years imprisonment.' 69 The
maximum penalty for business entities increased70from a one-hundred-thousand
dollar to a five-hundred-thousand dollar fine.
(6) The SOA
recommends, but does not require, that CEOs sign corporate
7
tax returns.'1

(7) The SOA requires that anyone who tampers with or obstructs an official
proceeding be fined, imprisoned up to twenty years, or both.'72
(8) The SOA provides a penalty of a fine, imprisonment up to ten years, or
both for retaliating against any corporate whistleblower. 73

162. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(b) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(i)).
163. Id. § 802(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519-1520).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. § 902(a) (to be codified at IS U.S.C. § 1349).
168. Id. § 903(a)-(b) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343).
169. Id. § 904 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1131).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 1001.
172. Id. § 1102 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512).
173. Id. § 1107(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)). A whistleblower in this case is
any person who provides any truthful information relating to the commission or possible
commission of any federal offense to a law enforcement officer.
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D. State Legislative Reform Proposals
Because the SOA mainly affects securities reporting companies listed on
major stock exchanges, some states are seeking changes in corporate
responsibility that will apply to smaller, closely held, and not-for-profit

corporations.
The New York Attorney General has proposed state corporate reform in the
following areas: (1) protecting honest whistleblowers from retaliation; (2)
protecting against fraud in not-for-profit corporations, including requiring
officers to sign annual reports, mandating audit committees, and preventing
self-dealing; and (3) preventing cover-ups of corporate crimes, addressing
misconduct by corporate officers, and improving oversight of the accounting
industry.' 74
Colorado passed legislation prohibiting a public corporation from making
loans to directors.'
Kansas passed legislation to: (1) prohibit influencing or misleading persons
in the preparation of financial statements or appraisals; (2) prohibit the
destruction or falsifying of records; and (3) protect whistleblowers from
retaliation for providing truthful information.'76
The Maryland state legislature considered adopting similar legislation,
entitled the Corporate Accountability Act of 2003, but the legislation failed
to pass.' The Act would have: (1) prohibited a registered public accounting
firm that performs specified audits for a securities issuer from providing
specified non-audit services; (2) prohibited a registered public accounting firm
from providing audit services for a securities issuer if specified partners of the
firm have performed audits for the issuer during a specified time period or if
the firm employed specified officers of the issuer within the previous year;
and (3) provided whistleblower protections for employees who report
specified violations.' 78
Texas is considering requiring a certified annual report for all private
corporations doing business in Texas that resembles the certified annual filing
179
required in the SOA.

174. See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney Gen., Office of the N.Y. Attorney Gen.,
Statement by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding the Comments of U.S. Representative
Michael Oxley (Jan. 24, 2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/agpress03.htnil.
175. Gen. Assem. 03-1218, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
176. S. 110, 2003 Sess. (Kan. 2003); H. 2347, 2003 Sess. (Kan. 2003).
177. S. 560, 417th Gen. Assem., 2003 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2003).
178. Id.

179. S. 605, 2003 Leg., 78th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
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We can expect further state action, as well as changes in the Model
Business Corporation Act in regard to improving the ability of state law to
deal with conflicts of interest on the part of corporate directors and officers. 80
'
E. PreliminaryProposalsof the American BarAssociation Task Force on
CorporateResponsibility
In March 2002, the American Bar Association (ABA) formed a task force
to examine systemic issues relating to corporate responsibility arising out of
the Enron failures.'' The preliminary report of the task force contains
specific recommendations regarding mandatory internal corporate governance
for public corporations and the conduct of in-house and outside lawyers
representing them.8 2 A list of those recommendations includes:
(1) A substantial majority of the members of the board of directors should
be independent of management, both in fact and in appearance.' 83
(2) The board of directors should appoint a Corporate Governance Committee entirely composed of independent directors, and which may consist of
all of the independent directors. 8 4
(3) The Audit and Compensation Committees of the board of directors
should be composed entirely of independent directors.' 85
(4) The Corporate Governance Committee should recommend that the
board of directors adopt a corporate code of ethics and conduct that includes
the establishment of a mechanism - such as a hot line, an ombudsman, or
compliance certification - through which information can be freely
transmitted to senior officers and, if necessary, to the Audit or Corporate
86
Governance Committee.
(5) The Corporate Governance Committee, the Audit Committee, or another
committee composed exclusively of independent directors and appointed for
the purpose by or on the recommendation of the Corporate Governance
Committee, should review and approve any material transaction between the
corporation and any director or executive officer, including a loan or
guarantee by the corporation.' 87

180. Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, 58 Bus. LAW. 189, 197 (2002).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 198.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 199.
187. Id.
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(6) The Corporate Governance and Audit Committees should establish
procedures for regular meetings with the corporate officers responsible for
implementing the corporation's internal controls, codes of ethics, and
compliance policies. Such officers include general counsel, the chief internal
auditor, and the chief compliance officer.'88
The Task Force made further recommendations regarding the best practices
of corporate -governance:
(1) Encourage active and informed input by independent directors."'
(2) Establish term limits or policies governing the rotation of the chair and
membership of the board of directors and its Corporate Governance, Audit,
and Compensation Committees, and the number of board and committee
memberships. 190
(3) Institute and maintain training and education programs for all directors,
particularly independent directors, in regard to (a) their legal and ethical
responsibilities as directors; (b) the financial condition, principal operating
risks, and performance factors materially important to the business of the
corporation; and (c) the operation, significance, and effect of compensation
incentive programs and related party transactions.'9 1
(4) Institute procedures for directors to periodically evaluate (a) the
effectiveness and adequacy of meetings of the board of directors and its
committees; (b) the adequacy and timeliness of the information provided by
management to the board of directors; (c) the diversity of experience of
individual directors; and (d) the contributions of each director.' 92
While this report is preliminary, it provides a beginning road map for states
to revisit the roles of lawyers and corporate officials in addressing and
resolving conflicts of interest. In order to restore public confidence in the
American business systems, a careful balance must be found between freedom
and government regulation and self-regulation. The report suggests some selfregulatory steps that corporations may take to start the process of developing
systems that can restore and preserve public confidence.
V. Conclusion
Oklahoma's legislative developments are commendable. The OGCA adopted in 1986 and patterned after the DGCL' 93 - has kept the pace of
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id.
FAUGHT, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 1-2.
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modernity with frequent amendments.' 94 The Senate Bill 610 amendments
continue this trend. The electronic communication amendments are especially
welcome, permitting the kinds of communications between corporations and
their directors and shareholders that many companies are using elsewhere in
their businesses. The LLC Act too has kept pace. Oklahoma was an early
adopter of LLCs in 1992.'9' The LLC Act was among the first "second
generation" acts. 6 Through regular amendments, it has remained among the
better LLC acts in the nation. 97 The Senate Bill 610 amendments to the LLC
Act continue its betterment. These changes, and the adoption of uniform acts
such as RUPA'98 and UETA,' provide a modern statutory framework for
Oklahomans and Oklahoma businesses.
The modern statutory framework for business entities also provides a basis
for more predictable judicial outcomes. Although Oklahoma courts handle
relatively few cases dealing with business entity law,2" the paucity of
Oklahoma cases need not create a vacuum. Oklahoma's business entity
statutes - the OGCA for corporations, the LLC Act for LLCs, RUPA for
partnerships and RULPA for limited partnerships - do not stand in isolation.
The modeling of the OGCA upon the DGCL means that Oklahoma
practitioners can turn to a trove of Delaware cases and corporate legal treatises
to guide them. The LLC Act was based on an early American Bar Association
prototype that later became the Uniform LLC Act. In later amendments, the
LLC Act borrowed concepts from the Delaware LLC Act. With these sources,
Oklahoma courts and practitioners can turn for guidance to Delaware and the
several jurisdictions with the Uniform LLC Act. Similarly, RUPA and
RULPA - both widely adopted uniform acts - afford much guidance from
other jurisdictions and from legal commentary.

194. Since the OGCA's adoption in 1986, the OGCA Committee prepared changes resulting
in OGCA amendments in 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2001.
195. Gary W. Derrick, Oklahoma Limited Liability Companies and Limited Liability
Partnerships,22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 643, 646-47 (1997).
196. Id. at 646 n.l.
197. The OGCA Committee prepared changes resulting in LLC Act amendments in 1993,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2001. In an October 2001 seminar, John M. Cunningham, a
nationally known lecturer on LLCs, described the Oklahoma LLC Act as "rank[ing] high in
LLC act quality by national standards." OKLAHOMA LLC ACT (THE "ACT") - GENERAL
COMMENTS BY A NON-OKLAHOMA LAWYER (Okla. Bar Ass'n, 2001).
198. 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-100 to 1-1207 (2001).
199. 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 15-101 to 15-121 (2001).
200. See supra note 15.
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